

THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS
ARE ATTACHED:
(Please do not remove)

DDA 86-2037

ICS 87-4018

ICS 4015 88

SUBJECT:

COMPUSEC

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE	9 FEB 1988
TO: C/IHC			
ROOM NO.	BUILDING		
REMARKS: The attached copies are being returned per your request of 27 January 1988 (ICS 4015 88).			
FROM: ER (JOAN)			
ROOM NO. 7E12	BUILDING Hqs	EXTENSION	

FORM NO.
1 FEB 56 241REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Information Handling Committee
WASHINGTON, DC 20505

DCI/ICS 4015-88
27 January 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

SUBJECT: Recall of DCI's COMPUSEC Threat Statement II Document

1. Copies of the DCI's COMPUSEC (Computer Security) Threat Statement II, dated Fall 1986, are being recalled for correction. Please send your copy to the address below, and a revised version will be returned to you:

Intelligence Community Staff
DCI's Intelligence Information Handling Committee

25X1
25X1

2. If you have any questions or need more information, please contact

25X1

Chairman

25X1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DCI/ICS 87-4018
4 March 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Lieutenant General Edward J. Heinz, USAF
Director, Intelligence Community Staff

SUBJECT: Transmittal of the COMPUSEC (Computer Security) Threat
Statement II to NFIC and NTISSC

1. This memorandum forwards to you the two documents comprising the COMPUSEC (Computer Security) Threat II Statement. The first of the two documents is the Executive Summary; the second is the complete COMPUSEC Threat Statement II.

STAT 2. The Threat papers were prepared under the auspices of Mr. Casey's Computer Security Project, led by [redacted] utilizing a group of experts convened during the period January-December, 1986. The substance of this COMPUSEC Threat Statement II has been briefed to NFIC officials in CIA, DIA, NSA, Department of State, and the FBI.

3. The intent of the Computer Security Threat effort was to have you promulgate the attached documents within NFIC and the NTISSC committee structure as appropriate. Mr. Casey signed out the first such Threat Statement in January, 1985; it served as catalyst for many of the computer security programs in the last two years.

4. I recommend that you sign out the second Computer Security Threat Statement in the same manner and with the same objective. I have attached a transmittal memorandum for that purpose for your signature.

STAT [redacted]
Edward J. Heinz
Lieutenant General, USAF

Attachments:
As Stated



C-104-1r

SUBJECT: Transmittal of the COMPUSEC (Computer Security) Threat
Statement II to NFIC and NTISSC

DCI/ICS 87-4018

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STAT DCI/ICS/IHC, (2Mar87)

TOP SECRET

ER 1049 87

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

16 March 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

SUBJECT: Transmittal of the COMPUSEC (Computer Security)
Threat Statement II

25X1 1. The attached assessment of the threat to the security of Intelligence Community automated information systems and networks processing Sensitive Compartmented Information has been prepared under the auspices of the DCI's Computer Security (COMPUSEC) Project. It is forwarded herewith for your information and use in conjunction with our ongoing Community programs to substantially improve computer security. [redacted]

25X1 2. I believe that we need to maintain a continuing assessment of the threat to the security of our information handling systems, and propose that this be done under the auspices of the NTISSC in coordination with recently established Interagency Groups in the counterintelligence field. [redacted]

25X1 [redacted]
Robert M. Gates
Acting Director

25X1 Attachment:
COMPUSEC Threat Statement II
Volume I [redacted]
Volume II [redacted]

25X1 TOP SECRET

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DDA 86-2037
3 December 1986

25X1 NOTE FOR: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: COMPUSEC

Vicki:

25X1 1. When [REDACTED] briefed several of us on the COMPUSEC project and
the recommendations that flow from it, I commented at the time about the
strong statement--recommendation--pertaining to funding for COMPUSEC. If I
25X1 recall correctly, I indicated that although it may not be apparent, the
attempts in recent years, including those by [REDACTED] to draw more attention
to COMPUSEC have paid off.

2. After our discussion, I asked that a summary of funds at CIA
contributed to computer security be prepared for me. As a sample, four
elements within the Agency were queried to obtain a total sample. The
25X1 following was found: These four elements spent or have set aside for computer
security--FY-85 [REDACTED]; FY-86 [REDACTED]; FY-87 [REDACTED]
The trend is apparent! The totals include personal and non-personal services.

3. One has to dig into our budgets to ferret out this data. It usually
does not appear as a line item. I'm sure if we took the time to dig into the
budgets of all of the elements that make up CIA, these figures would increase.

25X1 [REDACTED]
William F. Donnelly

25X1 [REDACTED]

DCI
EXEC
REG

S E C R E T

C-104-11

ORIG:DDA:WFDonnelly:jal:3 Dec 86

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S E C R E T

25 NOV 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration

25X1 FROM: [REDACTED]

Deputy Director for Physical &
Technical Security25X1 SUBJECT: Estimate of Computer Security
Expenditures for 1985-1987 [REDACTED]

1. The attached table outlines the actual and planned expenditures for computer security within this Agency. The figures were obtained informally through contact with those offices appearing on the table. [REDACTED]

2. The base figures for OS support a cadre of computer security professionals to promulgate security policy; to provide advice and guidance; and to conduct risk analysis, audits and inspections for Agency and contractor automated information systems. The base FY 87 OIT budget supports a security auditing staff to monitor Agency main frame computers. The OIT FY 87 figures reflect a decrease in total dollars from FY 86; this reflects the transfer of resources from OIT to OS at the beginning of FY 87. [REDACTED]

3. The other category that appears in the OS budget is the COMPUSEC ongoing initiative. In FY 86 the COMPUSEC ongoing initiative was heavily burdened by Gramm-Rudman and DDA cuts, and only [REDACTED] was actually spent out of non-personal services. [REDACTED]

4. The table does not include any figures for the Office of Communications. OC prefers to report their investments under the purview of "communications security". They did, however, estimate annual costs related to computer security are as follows: [REDACTED] for personal services attributed to systems


S E C R E T

25X1




5. These figures were obtained by contacting the component B&F officer or the project manager of the offices indicated in the table. It is not, however, representative of an "accurate" total accounting for computer security outside OS and OIT. If detailed accounting is desired, we would be happy to act as the focal point for gathering the information.

25X1



25X1



Attachment
Table

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RECOMMENDATION FOR ACTION

High Priority NFIP Budget Allocations for COMPUSEC

- The current FY 87-88 NFIP does not contain funding allocations that have been formally matched to COMPUSEC threat concerns. The DCI/DDCI, through the DICS, should designate a supplemental SCI-COMPUSEC fund (or a designated funding allocation) to support critical COMPUSEC requirements.

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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

SCI-COMPUSEC Policy Modification

- The general NFIB guidance is stated in DCID 1/16. This document is currently being modified by the IHC. Priority and support should be accorded to this effort by NFIB seniors.
- Generally, NFIB members implement DCID 1/16 via specific agency policies. A formal coordinated effort is needed to ensure consistency of NFIC COMPUSEC policies with the current and changing DCID 1/16.

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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

COMPUSEC Threat Awareness and Training

- Necessary steps in reducing the COMPUSEC threat, in decreasing the costs of risk management, and in reducing the costs of SCI compromise are to:
 - ...Increase the awareness of managers, policy officials, and
 - ...Provide current and consistent "training" for security officers, computer personnel, and computer system users.
- DCI/DDCI, in conjunction with NFIB seniors, should adopt a policy encouraging and supporting COMPUSEC Threat Awareness and Training. Implementation could probably best be two-phased, i.e.,
 - ...Formal COMPUSEC threat training courses implemented by NFIB Security Officers for Security Officers and computer personnel
 - Utilizing computer-aided-instruction (CAI) for consistency and ease of uniformity in updating
 - Forming the basis for continual accreditation checks
 - ...Briefing teams charged with improving and updating the COMPUSEC threat awareness of NFIB managers, policy officials, and computer users.

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MEMORANDUM

TO: DDICS

FROM:

DATE: November 18, 1986

SUBJECT: Recommendations for DICS Actions Resulting
from the COMPUSEC Threat Statement II of
1986

I have attached a set of actions recommended for your and the DIC's attention. Each recommendation occupies a separate sheet.

The COMPUSEC Threat Executive Policy Group would like to discuss these with you and Ed Heinz. I shall arrange such a meeting at the earliest possible date.